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Abstract 1 
Social interactions are the result of individuals’ cooperative and competitive tendencies 2 
expressed over an extended period of time. Although social manipulation, i.e., using another 3 
individual to achieve one’s own goals, is a crucial aspect of social interactions, there has been 4 
no comprehensive attempt to differentiate its various types and to map its cognitive and 5 
motivational determinants. For this purpose, we survey in this article the experimental 6 
literature on social interactions in nonhuman primates. We take social manipulation, 7 
illustrated by a case study with orangutans (Pongo abelii), as our starting point and move in 8 
two directions. First, we will focus on a flexibility / sociality axis that includes technical 9 
problem solving, social tool-use and communication. Second, we will focus on a motivational 10 
/ prosociality axis that includes exploitation, cooperation, and helping. Combined, the two 11 
axes offer a way to capture a broad range of social interactions performed by human and 12 
nonhuman primates. 13 
 14 
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1. Introduction 1 
In the last 20 years two major lines of research on the social psychology of nonhuman 2 
primates developed, one on cooperation and helping, and one on theory of mind and 3 
deception. Whereas the literature on cooperation focused mainly on the underlying 4 
motivation of the cooperators, the theory of mind literature focused on the cognitive nature of 5 
the underlying representations. It has recently been proposed that these two lines of research 6 
need to be re-aligned (Schmelz and Call, 2016). This re-alignment requires, first, to examine 7 
whether nonhuman animals are also sensitive to the perspectives, knowledge states, and 8 
beliefs of their cooperators, and second, to dissect the cognitive processes involved in 9 
cooperating with others (see also Albiach-Serrano, 2015). 10 
Social interactions are relevant in many contexts and depend to a large degree on the socio-11 
ecology of a species. Differences in social interactions might be accompanied by variations in 12 
socio-cognitive abilities. Primates are a diverse taxonomic group characterized by a broad 13 
range of socioecological lifestyles. Cooperative interactions in primates, for example, have 14 
many manifestations such as grooming, pair bonding, group hunting, or agonistic support. 15 
Notwithstanding the manifold contexts and manifestations of social interactions, we will 16 
focus here on experimental studies aiming at cooperative and competitive problem solving. 17 
We focus on these studies because the immediate payoffs that result from social interactions, 18 
the ways animals can coordinate their actions with each other (e.g., physical interactions, 19 
communication), and the temporal extent of these interactions (trial duration and number) can 20 
be measured or even manipulated. Even though most of the reviewed studies focus on 21 
prosocial tendencies and coordination, they also allow us to assess primates’ selfish and 22 
manipulative strategies. 23 
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Various definitions of social interactions have been used in the literature. Noë (2006) 1 
proposed that cooperation and social interactions more generally can be classified along 2 
different dimensions including form, outcome, and temporal extent. Form-based definitions 3 
are informative about the social nature and specificity of the strategies that individuals are 4 
adopting. Noë distinguished between instrumental cooperation and communicative 5 
cooperation. Instrumental cooperation encompasses instances in which two animals 6 
simultaneously try to solve a problem without necessarily taking the role of the partner into 7 
account. Communicative cooperation refers to situations in which animals coordinate their 8 
actions by communicating with each other. By definition, communicative cooperation 9 
involves social interactions (rather than incidental co-acting) and greatly benefits from some 10 
basic capacity for goal understanding. Outcome-focused definitions define social interactions 11 
in terms of the payoff that each individual receives following a social interaction. The 12 
temporal dimension of social interactions is important here. The returns may be immediate or 13 
delayed, whereby the extent of the delay feeds back on the value of the outcome (cf. temporal 14 
discounting). Repeated interactions expressed over an extended period of time might enable 15 
tolerance towards asymmetrical outcomes of single interactions.  16 
However, focusing on one dimension only can be misleading. For instance, focusing only on 17 
the outcome of an interaction might result in a classification that includes optimal foraging 18 
strategies without any social component. This is exemplified by studies that used operant 19 
chambers to examine social interactions. Typically, these studies involve two animals, each 20 
one in a different operant chamber (e.g., Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1978; Stephens et al., 21 
2002). Following individual training, the animals make decisions in the test that affect not 22 
only their own outcome but also the outcome of their ‘partner’ (i.e. a conspecific in an 23 
adjacent compartment). Even if there are control conditions that show that the partner’s 24 
presence is affecting the subjects’ decisions, these studies might be explained by instrumental 25 
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learning together with social facilitation effects. Giving subjects the opportunity to interact 1 
directly with each other increases the ecological validity of the task and might produce 2 
additional evidence supporting the role of socio-cognitive processes in these studies. 3 
Focusing on the form of an interaction without considering the outcome, in contrast, must fall 4 
short of differentiating between different types of social interactions and their motivational 5 
foundation. Food-related motivation, in turn, may be uncovered by manipulating the payoff 6 
structure of the problem situation. 7 
For these reasons, we will use two interrelated axes to classify social interactions in 8 
nonhuman primates (see Figure 1). The first cognitive axis focuses on flexibility and sociality 9 
involved in cooperative problem-solving tasks. It includes technical problem solving, social 10 
tool-use and communication. The second axis focuses on motivational aspects that include 11 
spite, exploitation, cooperation, and helping. The challenges differ depending on whether the 12 
partners’ goals are coinciding or in conflict. With coinciding goals, the challenge is to 13 
coordinate actions with a partner; conflicting goals might rather afford manipulating others.  14 
In this paper, we review experimental research on the cognitive and motivational processes 15 
supporting social interactions of nonhuman primates. We will pay special attention to 16 
instances in which nonhuman animals manipulate each other, as these shed light on cognitive 17 
as well as motivational aspects of social interactions. On the cognitive side, we will include 18 
reports on coercion, harassment, solicitation, and communication in cooperative problem 19 
solving situations. On the motivational side, we address (besides cases of self-regard) 20 
mechanisms that allow for maintaining cooperation even in situations resulting in unbalanced 21 
payoffs like, for instance, delayed reciprocation, trust, and prosociality. Antisocial motives 22 
may also be at work during some interactions, in particular when animals are faced with 23 
unequal payoffs or labor distribution. However, as we will point out, the presence of 24 
antisocial motives is only rarely examined in experimental studies. 25 
6 
 
 
 
We organized the article as follows. First, we present a case study with orangutans that 1 
illustrates the interplay between the two axes. Second, we address the question how primates 2 
manipulate their conspecifics during social interactions in situations when they can exert 3 
physical control over conspecifics but also in cases in which this is not possible. Third, we 4 
examine the motivational underpinnings of primates’ social interactions. In particular, we 5 
look at how they move from exploitation to cooperation and helping. Finally, we end by 6 
discussing the relation between the two axes at a proximate and an ultimate level. 7 
 8 
2. Cooperation and social tool-use in orangutans: a case study 9 
Social complexity has been suggested to be a driving factor for the evolution of cognitive 10 
flexibility in primates. Accordingly, group-living might increase resource competition among 11 
group members. Therefore, socio-cognitive abilities that allow for competing with others 12 
effectively may follow, in particular, social manipulation, tactical deception and coordination 13 
abilities (Byrne and Whiten, 1988; Dunbar, 1998). Few studies, however, directly tested this 14 
hypotheses by comparing primate species with different socio-ecological lifestyles in 15 
cognitive tasks (with some exceptions, see Amici et al., 2008; MacLean et al., 2008). In 16 
particular, more comparative experimental work on cooperation and social manipulation with 17 
broader phylogenetic coverage is needed. 18 
Orangutans have a semi-solitary lifestyle. From their current socio-ecology, one would not 19 
necessarily expect them to have specialized cognitive abilities and / or prosocial tendencies 20 
scaffolding social interactions (at least relative to more gregarious primate species). Studying 21 
how orangutans as the least gregarious genus of extant great apes interact with each other 22 
when presented with cooperation problems might thus give us an interesting reference point 23 
for comparison with group-living primates.  24 
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We set out to investigate strategies in Sumatran orangutans’ (Pongo abelii) social interactions 1 
by looking at great ape mother-offspring dyads (Völter et al., 2015). To do so, we presented 2 
three orangutan mother-offspring dyads as well as one chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) and two 3 
bonobo (Pan paniscus) mother-offspring dyads with different situations in which we placed a 4 
food reward outside their enclosure. All apes lived in stable social groups in Leipzig zoo 5 
under similar housing conditions and were raised by their respective mothers (except for the 6 
chimpanzee mother who was nursery-raised). Crucially, the offspring (all juveniles were of 7 
similar age, MAge=4 years ± 2 months, Völter, Rossano, & Call, 2015, unpublished data), 8 
unlike their mothers, could reach the food reward due to their smaller body size. We 9 
examined how great ape mothers would react to this situation. We found a striking difference 10 
between orangutan and Pan mothers. All orangutan mothers not only stole food from their 11 
offspring once they had obtained it but they even proactively manipulated their offspring’s 12 
actions (see below). In contrast, we never observed anything resembling this with our three 13 
Pan mother-offspring dyads. Chimpanzee and bonobo mothers never stole the food that their 14 
offspring had obtained nor did they try to manipulate their offspring physically. The 15 
chimpanzee and bonobo juveniles could even retrieve the food and walk over to their 16 
mothers, sit on their lap, and eat it without any interference. Given the small sample size, the 17 
observed differences between Pan and Pongo need to be interpreted with caution. 18 
Nevertheless, these findings point to interesting differences in mothers’ tolerance towards 19 
their offspring feeding in their proximity, with greater tolerance in group-living Pan species 20 
compared to the semi-solitary orangutans. It is possible that the observed difference between 21 
orangutans and chimpanzees or bonobos was affected by the species-typical age of weaning. 22 
Weaning occurs later in orangutans (at around 7 years of age; van Noordwijk and van Schaik, 23 
2005) compared to bonobos and chimpanzees (at around 5 years of age; Pusey, 1983). All 24 
juveniles in our study were about 4 years of age and not completely weaned yet. However, 25 
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Pan immatures were presumably already more independent from their mothers with regard to 1 
foraging than orangutans. Thus, greater dependence of orangutan juveniles may have 2 
promoted their mothers stealing food from them. 3 
The orangutan mothers' proactive manipulation of their offspring consisted of actively 4 
coercing them into retrieving the food. By carrying their offspring to the locations where the 5 
offspring could access the food, pushing their hands and bodies toward the food and pulling 6 
them back once they had grabbed the food (see Figure 2 a and b), orangutan mothers gained 7 
access to the food. Crucially, this social tool-use depended on their offspring’s willingness to 8 
complete the required actions (i.e. grabbing the food). That is to say, orangutan mothers could 9 
only coerce their infants into performing parts of the solution. Specifically, they could bring 10 
their offspring’s hands and bodies close to the food but they could not force them to grab the 11 
food. Their actions, therefore, resembled physical tool use (e.g. using a stick to rake in an 12 
out-of-reach reward) but could not be reduced to it because they had to take the self-13 
controlled actions of the social tool into account. 14 
In a follow-up experiment, we extended these findings by showing how orangutan mothers 15 
would also coerce their offspring into retrieving a stick tool that they, in turn, required to 16 
access a food reward. Next, we were interested in whether orangutans’ tendency to use their 17 
offspring as a tool to access food and tools would also lead them to cooperate with their 18 
offspring if this was necessary to access food. Therefore, we set up a situation in which 19 
mothers received the stick tool at the beginning of each trial; however, now only their 20 
offspring could access the apparatus where the tool could be used (Völter et al., 2015). 21 
Inserting the tool into the apparatus activated a mechanism resulting in the delivery of food 22 
rewards for both mother and offspring. The two mothers tested with this setup quickly passed 23 
the tool to their offspring (see Figure 2 c). One mother actively handed the tool over to her 24 
son already in the first trial. The other one let her daughter take the tool from her in the first 25 
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trial. After she had seen her daughter inserting the tool in the apparatus in trial 1, she started 1 
to actively hand the tool over from the second trial onwards. Interestingly, they would not 2 
only pass the tool to the offspring but also actively push them into the direction of the tool-3 
use apparatus, if the offspring was reluctant to go there. In one instance, an orangutan mother 4 
only released her son once he had grabbed the tool that she was offering him. Thus, mothers 5 
were physically manipulating their offspring even while cooperating with them in order to 6 
obtain the desired reward.  7 
As a next step, we looked at whether adult orangutan females would cooperate with each 8 
other (Rossano, Völter, & Call, in preparation). We presented three adult orangutans (two of 9 
them had participated in previous study) with the same cooperative problem-solving 10 
apparatus as before. One individual received the tool but only another individual in the 11 
adjacent compartment of the enclosure could insert it into the apparatus. We found that the 12 
orangutan females passed the tool spontaneously and reliably to each other and maintained 13 
cooperation even when they knew they would not receive food in some trials.  14 
Finally, we were interested in the strategies orangutans would employ when both the 15 
potential tool giver and recipient had a visible nonsocial alternative. This nonsocial 16 
alternative consisted of a horizontally mounted Plexiglas chute with a food reward inside. By 17 
inserting the tool into this chute, the orangutans could push the food reward into a hole, down 18 
a ramp, and within their reach. Orangutans passed the tool on to their partner only if they 19 
could obtain a higher value food reward by cooperating with the partner. However, as their 20 
potential cooperators also had alternative options, passing the tool to the partner did not 21 
always lead to the desired outcome. If the partner preferred to use the tool for her nonsocial 22 
option, the tool giver would get nothing. Importantly, after having passed the tool, the tool 23 
giver could not control the decision of the tool recipient. Nevertheless, orangutans tried to 24 
cooperate by passing the tool in an unusual manner (something that they would not do before 25 
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we added the nonsocial option for the tool recipient). After some experience with the task, all 1 
tested orangutans passed the tool sometimes high above their head (see Figure 2 d), 2 
presumably to influence their partner’s choice. The cooperation apparatus (that would release 3 
food for both individuals) was mounted close to the ceiling of the enclosure, whereas the 4 
nonsocial apparatus was mounted below, near the floor. By passing the tool high, the partner 5 
was closer to the social apparatus when receiving the tool. However, their manipulative 6 
attempts were not always successful because the tool recipients tended to insert the tool in the 7 
apparatus that yielded the highest reward for them and not primarily based on the location 8 
where they received the tool. 9 
In summary, this series of experiments shows how orangutans flexibly manipulate their 10 
conspecifics by physically manipulating their bodies, transferring resources to conspecifics if 11 
necessary, and even attempt to exert control in the way they transfer these resources. 12 
Orangutans’ performance supports the role of social manipulation even within cooperative 13 
situations. On the one hand, orangutans’ preference for individual foraging suggests that their 14 
decisions were predominantly driven by self-regarding motives. It remains to be seen to what 15 
extent they can maximize their payoffs by taking the incentives of their partners into account. 16 
On the other hand, orangutans were able to maintain cooperation across multiple trials in 17 
which they knew they would not receive a reward. The precise mechanisms that allowed 18 
them to tolerate unbalanced outcomes over a limited period of time are not clear yet and 19 
should be addressed by future research. Importantly, these studies emphasize the need to 20 
consider both cognitive and motivational aspects when studying social interactions.  21 
 22 
3. From technical problem-solving to communication: Cognitive aspects of social 23 
manipulation 24 
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Field studies have provided observational evidence for social manipulations in various 1 
primate species. One such phenomenon has been called agonistic buffering (Deag and Crook, 2 
1971). Here, males use infants and/or females to reduce the likelihood of aggression. During 3 
or before potentially aggressive interactions among males, one of the males may pick up an 4 
infant or grab a female. Typically, this behavior reduces the agonistic nature of the male-male 5 
interaction. Such agonistic buffering has been described, for instance, in olive baboons, Papio 6 
anubis (Strum, 1983, 1984), Barbary macaques, Macaca sylvana (Deag and Crook, 1971; 7 
Whiten and Rumsey, 1973), and geladas, Theropithecus gelada (Dunbar, 1984). 8 
The experimental investigation of social manipulation, cooperation, and their psychological 9 
underpinnings typically involves tasks that require identical and simultaneous or 10 
complementary and sequential actions of usually two individuals. We will address here 11 
different cognitive strategies that animals employ to solve these problems. In particular, we 12 
differentiate these strategies based on the extent to which they are specific to the social 13 
domain and the flexibility they allow for in order to influence the behavior of others.  14 
Primates may use their technical knowledge, i.e. their knowledge about causal and physical 15 
relations in their environment, also in cooperative problem-solving situations. Instead of 16 
paying attention to their partner’s actions, animals may focus on the causal effects of their 17 
partner’s actions. Clear-cut cases of social manipulative strategies in cooperative problem 18 
solving involve direct physical and / or communicative interactions between participants. 19 
Such manipulative strategies have been termed social tool use (e.g., Bard, 1990; Bullinger et 20 
al., 2011a).  21 
We have subdivided social tool use previously into different levels depending on the extent to 22 
which the tool-user is exerting physical control over the social tool (Völter et al., 2015). This 23 
might involve complete or partial physical control, for cases in which the tool user coerces 24 
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the social tool physically into executing certain actions. Cases of complete control over the 1 
social tool (level 1) are equivalent to physical tool use. For example, a mother pulls back the 2 
arm of an infant who grabbed a food reward in order to bring the food within reach, which 3 
resembles pulling in a rake to access out of reach food. Partial control (level 2) involves a 4 
mixture between coercive behaviors of the tool user and self-controlled and self–initiated 5 
actions of the social tool. An example would be a mother guiding her infant’s arm toward an 6 
otherwise inaccessible food reward. Once the infants arm is close to the reward, the mother 7 
needs to wait until the infant has grabbed the food. Making predictions about self-controlled 8 
actions of other individuals can be seen as a first indication of a truly social manipulative 9 
strategy. 10 
There are also cases of social tool use in the absence of direct physical control. Here, the 11 
social tool acts without being physically constrained by the tool-user and social manipulation 12 
can work indirectly based on exerting control over certain resources (level 3) or based on 13 
communication, for instance, by producing attention-getters or pointing gestures to solicit 14 
cooperation from others (level 4). These types of social tool use will depend to a large degree 15 
on coinciding goals between the tool-user and the social tool like, for example, in mutualistic 16 
settings.  17 
3.1 Technical problem solving 18 
Many primate species are known as innovative and flexible problem-solvers (for recent 19 
reviews on individual problem-solving, see Seed and Mayer, in press; Völter and Call, in 20 
press). Innovation and tool-use rates are positively correlated in the primate clade with great 21 
apes and brown capuchin monkeys showing the highest performance (Lefebvre et al., 2004). 22 
These tool-using species select tools flexibly with respect to functional properties of the tools 23 
depending on the problem situation they are currently encountering. For example, apes and 24 
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capuchin monkeys select tools based on their length, rigidity, pliability, or weight depending 1 
on the task, often spontaneously without the opportunity for reinforcement learning over 2 
many trials (e.g., Manrique et al., 2010; Manrique et al., 2011; Mulcahy et al., 2005; Schrauf 3 
and Call, 2011; Schrauf et al., 2012). In contrast, their understanding of other object 4 
properties such as connectivity or support is less clear (e.g., Fujita et al., 2003; Herrmann et 5 
al., 2008; Povinelli, 2000). In any case, the point here is that primates may use their technical 6 
problem-solving abilities also in cooperative problem-solving tasks. 7 
In the cooperation literature, two main paradigms have been used to investigate nonhuman 8 
primates’ ability to work together: string-pulling tasks with identical roles and tool transfer 9 
tasks with complementary roles. Cooperative string-pulling tasks come in two variants; both 10 
require that two individuals pull at a string simultaneously to bring food rewards into reach. 11 
The degree to which the individuals need to synchronize their actions at the beginning of 12 
each trial differs, however. In the first variant, two individuals need to pull in a box that is too 13 
heavy for one individual alone (e.g., Crawford, 1937; Povinelli and O’Neill, 2000), or 14 
alternatively, two individuals need to pull two ropes simultaneously that are connected to a 15 
food dispensing mechanism (e.g., Chalmeau, 1994; Chalmeau et al., 1997a). The second 16 
variant is the loose string paradigm, which appears causally more transparent. Here, two 17 
individuals need to pull the two ends of a long rope simultaneously in order bring baited 18 
platforms within reach (e.g., Hirata and Fuwa, 2007). The rope is only loosely connected with 19 
the baited platform. If only one individual is pulling the rope, the other end of the rope will 20 
move out of reach and the food is lost for both individuals. Therefore, both variants require 21 
temporal synchronization of the actions but in the loose string variant individual pulling 22 
invariably results in the loss of food. 23 
As mentioned before, studies on individual string pulling have shown a limited understanding 24 
of connectivity and support in nonhuman primates (e.g., Fujita et al., 2003; Herrmann et al., 25 
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2008; Povinelli, 2000). This is problematic for cooperation studies building to some extent on 1 
the assumption that subjects understand how the string pulling apparatus works. Notably, the 2 
string pulling setups used in cooperation studies are usually more complex than the ones used 3 
in individual string pulling. It is therefore unsurprising that most of the cooperative apparatus 4 
problems required extensive experience with the task-relevant contingencies. In some studies 5 
subjects required extensive training already at the stage of individual familiarization with the 6 
task (e.g., Chalmeau and Gallo, 1993). In other studies, subjects required extensive 7 
experience before entering the critical test phase. In the critical test phase of the loose string 8 
paradigm, for instance, the arrival of the partner at the apparatus is delayed. Therefore, the 9 
subject needs to wait for the partner to arrive before pulling in the rope. Chimpanzees in the 10 
original study by Hirata and Fuwa (2007) received more than 500 trials without a delay 11 
before they entered this delay condition. Other studies with the same paradigm did not use a 12 
training procedure and found that some chimpanzee dyads succeeded spontaneously in this 13 
cooperation task but they also relaxed the requirement for pulling simultaneously by making 14 
the rope longer (Melis et al., 2006b, c).  15 
Subjects may succeed in the delay condition by learning to take the role of their partner into 16 
account. However, other explanations do not require any attention to the role of the partner. 17 
For example, subjects may learn to pull the string only if they feel tension at the string, which 18 
is usually only the case when the partner is holding the opposite end of the string. 19 
Alternatively, they might synchronize to an external event such as the door opening or the 20 
behavior of the human experimenter that signals the arrival of the partner. In one of the first 21 
experimental studies on cooperation, chimpanzees were explicitly trained to pull 22 
simultaneously in response to a verbal command by the experimenter (Crawford, 1937). 23 
Hirata and Fuwa (2007) also noted that chimpanzees were synchronizing their actions to the 24 
experimenter stepping aside at the beginning of the trial. Moreover, sometimes a shaping 25 
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procedure is used in the delay, gradually increasing the delay of the partner’s arrival, which 1 
makes operant conditioning more likely (Melis et al., 2006b).  2 
One might argue that domain-general strategies such as instrumental learning would not 3 
predict large species differences in this task. Some species (e.g., Pan troglodytes, Hirata and 4 
Fuwa, 2007; Elephas maximus, Plotnik et al., 2011) learned to wait for the partner in the 5 
loose string paradigm, while others did not (Corvus corax, Massen et al., 2015; Canis 6 
familiaris, Ostojić and Clayton, 2014; Psittacus erithacus, Péron et al., 2011; Corvus 7 
frugilegus, Seed et al., 2008). However, obvious factors that might contribute to the failure of 8 
some species in the delay conditions are interspecies differences in inhibitory control and / or 9 
physical understanding of the task. 10 
Other cooperation or helping studies involved sequential actions. In these studies, usually two 11 
individuals were located in separate but adjacent compartments. One individual receives one 12 
or multiple tools (the tool giver) but only the partner (the tool user) can use one of the tools. 13 
Again, subjects might just learn over trials that they need to pass the tool to the adjacent cage, 14 
which will result in a food reward for both. Thus, it is possible that subjects solve these tasks 15 
without taking the role of the partner into account. Looking at the way subjects pass the tool 16 
(e.g. passing the tool directly to the partner) and communication between partners (e.g. 17 
begging gestures by the tool recipient) may be informative here. Sometimes the tool giver has 18 
multiple potential tools available (functional and non-functional ones). Selective tool transfer 19 
has been considered as evidence that individuals know what their partner needs (Yamamoto 20 
et al., 2012). However, usually subjects received an individual training phase before entering 21 
the dyadic test phase. In the training, subjects might have learned to prefer certain tools to 22 
others in certain contexts. Alternatively, they might pass on the object that they themselves 23 
cannot use currently (Melis and Tomasello, 2013; Yamamoto et al., 2009).  24 
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Future studies should address these issues by examining how quickly apes can learn to 1 
synchronize their behavior with a nonsocial event, which is as salient as a conspecific (see 2 
Heyes, 2015, for a similar criticism on the theory of mind literature). Likewise, in the 3 
sequential action paradigms studies might explore whether subjects would learn at equal rates 4 
to pass the tool to an empty compartment given the same reinforcement schedule and stimuli 5 
that attract their attention to a similar extent compared to a conspecific. Moreover, studies 6 
should address other nonsocial strategies such as whether apes in the loose string paradigm 7 
are merely sensitive to the tension at the rope when they are apparently waiting for their 8 
partner to arrive.  9 
3.2 Coercive interactions 10 
Coercing another individual into performing certain actions is costly due to physical demands 11 
associated with it and because it can result in conflicts with the target individual and other 12 
group members. A power differential between the interactants is a prerequisite for coercion to 13 
occur. However, power differential is also related to low tolerance between group members. 14 
Low tolerance, in turn, has been identified as one of the factors limiting the occurrence of 15 
cooperation in non-human primates (Melis et al., 2006c; Petit et al., 1992; Werdenich and 16 
Huber, 2002). This is probably also why most coercive interactions that have been described 17 
in the literature during instrumental cooperation tasks occurred between adults and infants or 18 
juveniles. Adult-offspring relationships often combine high tolerance with a marked power 19 
differential between individuals. 20 
In a tool-use study with Japanese macaques (Macaca fuscata) that required the monkeys to 21 
use stick tools or stones to extract a piece of food from a horizontal tube, three females used 22 
their infants as tools to retrieve the reward (Tokida et al., 1994). Once the infants had climbed 23 
into the tube by themselves and bit the apple, their mothers pulled them back and took the 24 
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food from them (level 1 social tool-use). One female took this one step further by taking 1 
action before the infants made contact with the food. Not only did she pull her infants back 2 
once they bit the apple but she brought them to the tube and pushed them inside it to begin 3 
with (level 2). Over the course of time, she used all of her four infants in this way as social 4 
tools. When we presented orangutan (Pongo abelii) mother-offspring dyads with comparable 5 
problem situations, in which only the offspring could access pieces of food, orangutan 6 
mothers displayed similar behaviors (Völter et al., 2015). Orangutan mothers dragged the 7 
offspring to the site where they could access the food, guided their arms and bodies towards 8 
the food, and pulled them back once the juveniles grabbed the food.  9 
Chalmeau (1994) reported in the context of the cooperative string-pulling task that a 10 
dominant chimpanzee repeatedly caught a juvenile with whom he had been working together 11 
before. He then carried the juvenile to the string-pulling site. However, the juvenile was often 12 
unwilling to pull the string after the adult had caught her and escaped towards her mother. 13 
The adult subsequently adopted a waiting strategy, by staying near the apparatus until the 14 
juvenile approached it voluntarily. Similarly, when the same task was presented to two 15 
subadult orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), one of them repeatedly pushed his partner toward 16 
one of the strings and waited until the latter pulled in the string (Chalmeau et al., 1997a).  17 
Instances of coercive social tool use have also been reported outside the primate clade. In an 18 
instrumental cooperation study with keas (Nestor notabilis), one individual had to operate a 19 
lever at one end of a seesaw-like apparatus for her partner to extract a food reward from a box 20 
underneath the other end of the seesaw (Tebbich et al., 1996). Presented with this task, three 21 
individuals aggressively approached subordinate partners until they would operate the lever, 22 
which allowed the dominant birds to access the food. In this way, the dominant individuals 23 
were enforcing cooperation. There is anecdotal evidence for coercive social tool use in 24 
elephants (Chevalier-Skolnikoff and Liska, 1993): large bulls were observed to push younger 25 
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ones against fences, which resulted in the fences breaking and allowing the elephants to pass 1 
through. 2 
3.3 Control via access to resources 3 
An animal might exert control during social interactions by controlling access to a feeding 4 
site or other task-relevant components (such as tools). In sequential-action cooperation 5 
problems, a tool is given to the subject who cannot use it because the tool use location is in 6 
the adjacent compartment of the enclosure inaccessible to the subject. The solution is to pass 7 
the tool to a conspecific in the adjacent compartment who can use the tool. Passing the tool 8 
may, depending on the study, result in a food reward for both individuals (mutualism) or only 9 
for one of them (helping). 10 
When chimpanzee dyads in adjacent compartments were presented with a mutual helping 11 
situation in which each chimpanzee required the tool of the other one to access food 12 
(Yamamoto et al., 2009), chimpanzees exchanged tools most of the time upon request (see 13 
section 3.4 on communication below). However, sometimes they also exchanged tools in the 14 
absence of such requests.  15 
In another variant of the tool transfer paradigm, chimpanzees were presented with an 16 
apparatus that required the use of two different tools from different sides of the apparatus 17 
(Melis and Tomasello, 2013). During the training, the chimpanzees learned to use both tools 18 
in sequence to extract food rewards. In the cooperation test phase, subjects could only access 19 
one side of the apparatus. The other side of it was accessible to another chimpanzee in the 20 
adjacent enclosure. The subject then received both tools. Ten out of 12 chimpanzees 21 
transferred tools to their partner and they tended to transfer the tool that their partner would 22 
need to operate her/his side of the apparatus. There was considerable variation in the onset of 23 
tool transfer but three of the chimpanzee started to pass the tool from the first trial onwards 24 
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(but they had experience with passing tools in a pilot experiment several months before the 1 
test). These findings raise the possibility that chimpanzees use conspecifics as social tools to 2 
complete an action they cannot do by themselves by supplying them with the task-relevant 3 
resources. Likewise, orangutans were adept at transferring tools to their partners (their 4 
offspring and kin and non-kin adults) on the basis of individual training with the task (Völter 5 
et al., 2015; Rossano et al., unpublished data). Additionally, in a token transfer task, 6 
orangutans, but not chimpanzees, bonobos, or gorillas, consistently exchanged tokens that 7 
were valuable only for their partners (Dufour et al., 2009; Pelé et al., 2009). 8 
 9 
3.4 Communication: soliciting behaviors and requests 10 
Crawford (1937) reported that two of five young chimpanzees that were trained on the 11 
cooperative string-pulling paradigm showed solicitation behaviors when their partner lost 12 
motivation and stopped pulling in the baited box. Crawford described sequences of behaviors 13 
that include leaving the rope and approaching the partner, producing begging gestures, 14 
whimpering, touching and pulling the partner on the shoulder, arm, and neck, returning to the 15 
string location, and looking toward the partner. If the partner was not responding by starting 16 
to pull the rope, these behaviors were sometimes repeated until the partner began to 17 
cooperate. Crawford noted that “often only after persistent solicitation did the partner take his 18 
rope and begin to pull” (p. 67). Once they showed these solicitation behaviors, they also used 19 
them with other partners. Crawford (1941) found such solicitation behaviors also in two 20 
adolescent chimpanzees with another cooperative problem-solving task involving sequential 21 
and complementary responses. 22 
Although Povinelli & O’Neill (2000) agreed that these solicitation behaviors might show that 23 
chimpanzees can manipulate each other’s behavior, they were skeptical whether chimpanzees 24 
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were using these behaviors deliberately to influence the intentions of their partner. Given that 1 
these behaviors only occurred after extensive training, Povinelli and O’Neill (2000) argued, it 2 
appears plausible that certain behaviors (that were part of their behavioral repertoire) were 3 
conventionalized by means of the reinforcement regime of the study, which resulted in the 4 
observed solicitation behaviors. In line with this notion, Crawford (1937) stated that “the 5 
solicited animal did not seem to know what to do, and only after trying a number of responses 6 
under continued solicitation, was the pulling-in behavior given, after which solicitation 7 
ceased” (p. 68).  8 
Using Crawford’s box-pulling task, Povinelli and O’Neill (2000) paired experienced 9 
chimpanzees that were trained to pull in the box together with naïve chimpanzees. In contrast, 10 
to Crawford’s results they did not find any evidence for physical or communicative 11 
manipulations by the experienced individuals compared to the naïve ones. In contrast to 12 
Crawford’s study, however, chimpanzees in Povinelli and O’Neill’s study received only two 13 
sessions per dyad. 14 
In line with the latter findings, Hirata and Fuwa (2007) and Melis and colleagues (2006c) 15 
found no soliciting behavior between chimpanzees in the loose string paradigm either. 16 
However, one chimpanzee showed soliciting behavior toward human partners (Hirata and 17 
Fuwa, 2007). When the human partner’s arrival at the apparatus was delayed by two seconds, 18 
the chimpanzee first failed to retrieve the food multiple times. After having failed seven 19 
times, the chimpanzee showed solicitation behavior by looking up at the experimenter’s face, 20 
whimpering, and taking his hand. In response to the chimpanzee taking his hand, the 21 
experimenter approached and operated the apparatus together with the chimpanzee. From this 22 
trial onwards, the chimpanzee showed soliciting behavior towards the human partner in most 23 
trials. However, when subsequently paired with a chimpanzee again, no soliciting behavior 24 
was observed. Soliciting behaviors by chimpanzees and a gorilla toward humans have been 25 
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reported before (Gómez, 1990; Köhler, 1925). Gómez, for example, described an episode in 1 
which an infant gorilla (Gorilla gorilla gorilla) took the hand of a human, guided him to a 2 
locked door, and placed his hand on the latch, which was interpreted as solicitation to open 3 
the door. Warneken and colleagues (2006), in contrast, did not find any evidence that juvenile 4 
chimpanzees would try to reengage a human partner after the latter had stopped participating 5 
in a cooperative activity.  6 
Melis et al (2006b) investigated whether chimpanzees would recruit the most skillful partner 7 
in the loose string paradigm. After some training with individual string-pulling, the delay 8 
condition that required them to wait for the partner, and training with a door mechanism, 9 
chimpanzees learned to open the door to recruit the most skillful cooperator (based on past 10 
cooperative experiences). However, as the authors reported, the most skillful partners were 11 
also more likely to sit in front of their respective door and to produce noises by shaking the 12 
door. Therefore, chimpanzees’ partner choice might have been at least partially driven by 13 
attention-getting behaviors by the most motivated partner.  14 
In another implementation of the loose string paradigm, two chimpanzees started with an 15 
individual foraging situation (Bullinger et al., 2011b; Duguid et al., 2014). At some point, 16 
they could both switch to the cooperative string pulling apparatus, which - if both decided on 17 
it - would lead to a higher value food reward for each chimpanzee (the studies were 18 
instantiating Rousseau’s Stag Hunt game). If only one individual decided on the cooperative 19 
option (i.e. the stag) by leaving the individual foraging option (i.e. the hare), she would lose 20 
both foraging options. Therefore, leaving the individual foraging site was a risky strategy. 21 
Chimpanzees coordinated their actions by using a leader-follower strategy. In about 10% of 22 
the trials, the leaders (i.e. the chimpanzee that was first to arrive at the cooperative string-23 
pulling apparatus) produced attention-getting behaviors such as clapping, banging against the 24 
mesh, and they vocalized when they were already at the cooperative option waiting for their 25 
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partner. However, chimpanzees (in contrast to human children) never reduced the risk of 1 
losing both foraging options by communicating before they had left the individual foraging 2 
option. 3 
Finally, in some of the tool transfer paradigms, chimpanzees handed tools over to 4 
conspecifics predominantly upon “request” by the tool recipient (Yamamoto et al., 2009, 5 
2012). Chimpanzees’ requests consisted of extending their arms inside the compartment of 6 
the other individual, clapping their hands, pounding against the panel between the 7 
compartments, and vocalizations. When extending their arm inside the neighbor’s 8 
compartment to reach for the tool, chimpanzees’ hands came very close to their partner due to 9 
the small size of the compartments. This might be important with regard to the underlying 10 
motivation here because chimpanzees could end these potentially harassing requests by 11 
passing the tool over (cf. harassment avoidance explanations, see section 4.3.4 on food 12 
sharing). In mother-offspring dyads, both participants showed requests at similar rates. In 13 
non-kin dyads, predominantly dominant individuals produced requests toward subordinates, 14 
which resulted in higher success rates for the dominants. Higher object transfer rates upon 15 
request were also observed between chimpanzees in a token exchange paradigm (Yamamoto 16 
and Tanaka, 2009) and between chimpanzees and capuchin monkeys, respectively, and 17 
human experimenters (Barnes et al., 2008; Warneken et al., 2007). In another token-exchange 18 
task that required apes to exchange tokens with each other before they could exchange the 19 
token eventually with a human experimenter, orangutans but not chimpanzees, bonobos, or 20 
gorillas frequently showed pointing and hand begging gestures toward their partner (Pelé et 21 
al., 2009). One male orangutan (who showed the highest rates of pointing and begging) was 22 
shown to receive more valuable tokens than expected by chance in response to pointing at 23 
them but not after having begged for it by holding out his hand. 24 
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These findings from the cooperation literature are supported by experimental food sharing 1 
studies in which typically a group of animals is provisioned with a large, high-value food 2 
resource that can be monopolized by one individual. In six chimpanzee groups, begging 3 
gestures usually preceded food transfers and producing begging gestures resulted in higher 4 
transfer rates (Silk et al., 2013). Nevertheless, even when producing begging gestures 5 
chimpanzees were successful in only 31% of cases. Begging gestures sometimes also 6 
preceded food transfers in orangutans in a similar food sharing study conducted in a captive 7 
group (Rossano and Liebal, 2014). However, this happened at lower rates than in the 8 
chimpanzees studied by Silk and colleagues. On the other hand, begging in orangutans was 9 
successful in 46% of cases. The same male orangutan who pointed at valuable tokens in the 10 
study by Pelé and colleagues (2009) also offered food occasionally to females by moving 11 
food toward them while looking at them (Rossano and Liebal, 2014). 12 
3.5 Summary  13 
While technical knowledge certainly can be used to solve problems with the participation of a 14 
partner, there is evidence that individuals go beyond this. However, at this point some 15 
important control conditions are still missing. For example, primates waiting for their partner 16 
in the loose string paradigm might be explained simply in terms of sensitivity to the tension 17 
of the string.  18 
Direct interactions between individuals show high degrees of flexibility in how primates 19 
manipulate each other. Great apes, in particular, show a wide range of manipulative 20 
behaviors. Surprisingly, the normally semi-solitary orangutans appear to be very skilled at 21 
exerting control over others in a highly flexibly manner. They manipulate others directly by 22 
coercing them into executing certain actions, indirectly by providing access to resources, or 23 
even by means of communication (e.g., pointing for a token). Chimpanzees have provided the 24 
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most examples of communication in cooperative contexts, such as attention-getters, begging 1 
gestures, and solicitation. However, they are also the best-studied species. Therefore, it 2 
remains unclear whether there are qualitative or quantitative differences between 3 
chimpanzees and other nonhuman ape species in this respect.  4 
 5 
 6 
4. From exploitation to helping: Motivational aspects of social interactions 7 
Aside from cognitive aspects, motivational aspects are critical for distinguishing between 8 
various forms of social interactions. In most experimental studies, researchers assessed the 9 
motivation of an individual by manipulating the food-related payoff structure of the task, 10 
other costs such as physical efforts needed to help others, or the temporal extent of social 11 
interactions (trial number, sequence, and duration). The types of interactions that we can 12 
classify along a motivational axis (self – self+other – other-regarding) are exploitation, 13 
mutualism, and helping (without or with costs for the helper). 14 
We define exploitation as an act that benefits one individual at a cost for others (cf. 15 
'manipulation' in Clutton-Brock, 2009). Exploitation typically occurs when the goals of two 16 
individuals are in conflict. The motivation is usually self-regarding (or other-regarding 17 
towards individuals other than the exploited individual).  18 
Mutualism is defined as cooperation that results in direct benefits for each participant (e.g., 19 
Clutton-Brock, 2009). The benefits might be asymmetrically distributed or to some extent 20 
delayed but, by definition, there must be a net gain for each participant. Mutualism is quite 21 
mute with regard to underlying motives other than self-regarding ones.  22 
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Helping is defined as an act that benefits another individual but does not provide direct 1 
benefits for the helper and might even entail costs for the helper (e.g., Warneken and 2 
Tomasello, 2006). Usually helping is thought to be supported by prosocial motives. However, 3 
there might also be instances of strategic helping in which helping is based on the expectation 4 
of some kind of delayed gratification.  5 
Punishment is defined as act that is detrimental to someone else, sometimes even at a cost for 6 
the punisher. Punishment is not covered in detail in the current review. We mention it here 7 
because it might be important for maintaining cooperation in the long run (in particular in the 8 
case of third-party punishment). So far, however, there is little evidence for punishment 9 
enforcing cooperation in nonhuman primates (e.g., Riedl et al., 2012). By definition, 10 
punishment must not involve a direct benefit for the punisher and can be driven by antisocial 11 
motives. However, it might also reflect an expectation of some kind of delayed gratification 12 
(e.g., the punished individual might be more willing to cooperate in the future) or even 13 
prosocial motives toward group members other than the punished individual (altruistic 14 
punishment, e.g., Fehr and Gaechter, 2002).  15 
 16 
4.1 Self-regarding motivation 17 
Even in a cooperative problem-solving context, primates might pursue a self-regarding 18 
optimal foraging strategy. Optimal foraging aims at maximizing own food intake while 19 
keeping foraging costs at a minimum (e.g., Pyke et al., 1977). As cooperation can lead to 20 
more efficient foraging, self-regarding motivation may be sufficient to account for mutualism 21 
and social comparisons in the form of disadvantageous inequity aversion (i.e., aversive 22 
responses when others receive more). 23 
4.1.1 Exploitation 24 
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Even though there are many studies on food competition in nonhuman primates (cf. theory of 1 
mind literature, for a recent review see Whiten, 2013), very few experimental studies have 2 
examined how primates actively manipulate others to outcompete them. The theory of mind 3 
literature focused on visual perspective taking and tracking others’ knowledge and beliefs. 4 
While these abilities might be beneficial for manipulating others, they do not necessarily 5 
involve any direct social interaction. 6 
Exploitative behaviors between individuals have been found in cooperation tasks with adult-7 
juvenile dyads in chimpanzees (Chalmeau, 1994), orangutans (Völter et al., 2015), and 8 
Japanese macaques (Tokida et al., 1994). In these studies, adults physically manipulated 9 
juveniles to access food for themselves. Other studies focused on tactical deception, which 10 
involves using actions or communication outside their usual contexts and, thereby, 11 
misleading others (Byrne and Whiten, 1988). However, most findings so far have concerned 12 
primates inhibiting actions in the presence of competitors or hiding body parts from 13 
competitors. In experimental studies, chimpanzees concealed their actions from competitors 14 
(e.g., Karg et al., 2015; Melis et al., 2006a) but there is less experimental evidence that they 15 
actively mislead others (in contrast to human children, e.g., Sodian et al., 1991). Two studies, 16 
however, found that chimpanzees who had witnessed where a food reward was hidden 17 
sometimes avoided this hiding place in the presence of a dominant conspecific (Hirata and 18 
Matsuzawa, 2001; Menzel, 1974). Menzel (1974) reported that a juvenile chimpanzee 19 
stopped uncovering food rewards in the presence of a dominant male who had stolen the food 20 
from her before. In a few trials over an observation period of several months, she even moved 21 
in the opposite direction from the food at first, thereby, leading the group away from the 22 
food. Only when the dominant competitor was distracted by searching for the food 23 
somewhere else she retrieved the food. Likewise, Hirata and Matsuzawa (2001) found 24 
evidence for active misleading in one out of five chimpanzee dyads. After multiple days in 25 
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which a dominant competitor, who was ignorant of the food location, followed the subject to 1 
the baited container, the subject started to approach the empty container first, thereby, 2 
directing the attention of the competitor to the empty container. This behavior emerged for 3 
the first time on day 24 of the experiment. Similar findings were obtained with mangabeys 4 
(Cercocebus torquatus torquatus; Coussi-Korbel, 1994). Whether the chimpanzees and 5 
mangabeys misled their competitors in the sense of producing a behavior to make others 6 
belief that the food was elsewhere, however, remains contentious. Alternatively, the subjects 7 
in these studies might have learned over multiple trials to avoid the baited container with the 8 
competitor in their vicinity. Additionally, approaching the empty containers may have been 9 
reinforced because it led the dominant individual to abandon the subject in order to search for 10 
the food. These instances of primates leading competitors away from a food resource may 11 
therefore constitute instances of learned deception not necessarily involving mental state 12 
attribution.  13 
4.1.2 Mutualism 14 
In most cooperation studies, both partners receive a food reward when they solve the problem 15 
together. Unless there is a choice between different alternatives (see prosocial choice task 16 
below) or the pay-off is unbalanced (see advantageous inequity aversion, reciprocity, and 17 
helping studies below), purely self-regarding motives may be sufficient to explain animals’ 18 
cooperative activities. 19 
Mutualism has been shown in many primate species, including chimpanzees (e.g., Chalmeau, 20 
1994; Crawford, 1937; Hirata and Fuwa, 2007; Melis et al., 2006b, c; Melis and Tomasello, 21 
2013; Suchak et al., 2014), bonobos, Pan paniscus (Hare et al., 2007), orang-utans 22 
(Chalmeau et al., 1997a; Völter et al., 2015), brown capuchin monkeys (Brosnan et al., 2006; 23 
Chalmeau et al., 1997b; de Waal and Davis, 2003; Hattori et al., 2005; Visalberghi et al., 24 
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2000), cottontop tamarins, Saguinus oedipus (Cronin et al., 2005; Cronin and Snowdon, 1 
2008), and different macaque species, Macaca tonkeana, M. mulatta, M. sylvanus (Molesti 2 
and Majolo, 2016; Petit et al., 1992). 3 
Young chimpanzees engaged in cooperative activities with human caretakers; however, 4 
mainly in a food acquisition context (Warneken et al., 2006). In contrast to children, 5 
chimpanzees did not shows any sign of interest in social games with human caretakers that 6 
did not involve food. Chimpanzees’ cooperation is especially pronounced in mutualistic 7 
settings (Greenberg et al., 2010). For example, when the food in the loose string paradigm is 8 
clumped in the middle of the platform and, therefore, potentially monopolizable by one 9 
individual, cooperation breaks down (Melis et al., 2006c). In general, when given the choice 10 
chimpanzees as well as bonobos, orangutans, and marmosets (Bullinger et al., 2013; 11 
Bullinger et al., 2011a; Rossano et al., in preparation; Rekers et al., 2011; but see Hare et al., 12 
2007) prefer to forage alone and thereby to maximize their own food intake. When a higher-13 
value food reward can be obtained by cooperating with others, chimpanzees and orangutans 14 
flexibly switch to the cooperative alternative (Bullinger et al., 2011a; Rossano et al., in 15 
preparation). 16 
Cooperation in capuchin monkeys also declined when the food was clumped in the center of 17 
the platform (de Waal and Davis, 2003). Other studies with distributed food rewards, which 18 
slightly differed in value between the partners, found more tolerance towards unequal reward 19 
distribution in capuchin monkeys (Brosnan et al., 2006). The latter finding might be 20 
explained by the potentially high substitutability of the used rewards (Schwartz et al., 2016). 21 
4.1.3 Disadvantageous inequity aversion 22 
Disadvantageous inequity aversion describes negative reactions (e.g. refusals to accept or to 23 
participate in a task) in response to witnessing someone else receiving more / better rewards 24 
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for the same labor. If appropriate controls confirm that the aversive response is not merely 1 
driven by frustration induced by the loss of high-value food, inequity aversion can be framed 2 
as a social comparison, one serving self-regarding motives, which might help to avoid being 3 
outcompeted by group members. 4 
The best studied primate species on inequity aversion is the brown capuchin monkey 5 
(Sapajus apella). In a seminal study, female (but not male) capuchin monkeys refused food 6 
rewards and stopped participating in a token exchange task when they observed how a 7 
conspecific received higher value food rewards for engaging in the same activity (Brosnan 8 
and de Waal, 2003). This effect was particularly pronounced when the subject had to work 9 
harder (i.e. exchange more tokens) for a lower-value reward compared to the partner (van 10 
Wolkenten et al., 2007, but see Fontenot et al., 2007). Extending these findings, in the 11 
prosocial choice task, capuchins prefer a prosocial choice to a selfish one, but only if the 12 
subject and its partner receive equal rewards (de Waal et al., 2008). When the partner had a 13 
higher-value reward, subjects’ choices did not deviate from chance, indicating that the 14 
monkeys were less inclined to give their partner a better reward compared to themselves 15 
(even when there were no costs for them). In a recent study, capuchin monkeys with no 16 
access to a high-value food resource on a platform even punished conspecifics who had 17 
access to the food by collapsing the food platform (Leimgruber et al., 2016). A no-partner 18 
control condition ensured that the monkeys’ behavior was aimed at the feeding conspecific 19 
and not simply induced by frustration at inaccessible food. Capuchin monkeys punished at 20 
equal rates in the presence of a feeding conspecific irrespective of whether the subject had 21 
lost access to the food before or whether their partner had stolen the food from them. Fletcher 22 
(2008) found additional evidence for disadvantageous inequity aversion. Here, male capuchin 23 
monkeys were more likely to select the equal rewards option (rather than the unequal option) 24 
when the partner was present but not when the partner was absent. 25 
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However, several studies could not replicate these findings with brown capuchin monkeys 1 
(Fontenot et al., 2007; McAuliffe et al., 2015; Sheskin et al., 2014; Silberberg et al., 2009). It 2 
has recently been suggested that differences in the value of food rewards and their 3 
substitutability may explain the variable results across studies. Accordingly, differences in 4 
value between high- and low-value food can be small despite clear differences in preference 5 
tests (Schwartz et al 2016). Small differences in value between the food rewards, in turn, may 6 
mask inequity-related responses. 7 
Chimpanzees have also shown variable responses to disadvantageous inequity with some 8 
studies providing positive evidence (Brosnan et al., 2005; Brosnan et al., 2010b) and others 9 
showing no effect (Bräuer et al., 2009), or even an opposite effect when subjects received 10 
unequal food without a task (Bräuer et al., 2006). Especially in a token exchange paradigm, 11 
two chimpanzee samples refused to exchange tokens when they received lower value rewards 12 
compared to conspecifics nearby (Brosnan et al., 2005; Brosnan et al., 2010b). Another group 13 
of chimpanzees did not show such an effect using the same token-exchange paradigm and 14 
controlling for order effects (Bräuer et al., 2009). Finally, a recent study found response to 15 
inequity (i.e. refusals to participate in token exchanges) only in female chimpanzees but not 16 
in males (Hopper et al., 2014). 17 
Inequity aversion in chimpanzees has also been examined using a version of the mini-18 
ultimatum game in which one individual, the proposer, can propose an equal split of rewards 19 
or an unequal split of rewards (favoring the proposer) to another individual, the responder. 20 
The responder can then accept the proposed split for both individuals or it can reject the 21 
rewards, which will result in neither getting any of the rewards. Chimpanzees (and bonobos) 22 
accepted all non-zero offers by a conspecific, leading to the interpretation that they were 23 
rationally maximizing their own payoffs without any evidence for social comparisons of the 24 
reward distribution (Jensen et al., 2007; Kaiser et al., 2012; Proctor et al., 2013). 25 
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No evidence for disadvantageous inequity aversion was obtained for orangutans (Bräuer et 1 
al., 2006; Brosnan et al., 2011), bonobos (Bräuer et al., 2006; Kaiser et al., 2012), squirrel 2 
monkeys, Saimiri sciureus and Saimiri boliviensis (Freeman et al., 2013; Talbot et al., 2011), 3 
owl monkeys, Aotus spp. (Freeman et al., 2013), cotton top tamarins, Saguinus oedipus 4 
(Neiworth et al., 2009), or common marmosets, Callithrix jacchus (Freeman et al., 2013). 5 
Recent studies have extended these findings by examining social evaluations based on third-6 
party interactions. Brown capuchin monkeys observed an interaction between two humans in 7 
which one actor either helped the other one or not, or in which one actor reciprocated or 8 
failed to reciprocate a received favor (Anderson et al., 2013a; Anderson et al., 2013b). 9 
Subsequently, the actors simultaneously offered food to the monkeys. The results show that 10 
capuchin monkeys avoided humans that had been unhelpful or had failed to reciprocate in the 11 
previous interaction. Common marmosets and squirrel monkeys showed a similar bias in that 12 
they avoided non-reciprocators (Anderson et al., 2016; Kawai et al., 2014) though it has been 13 
argued that different mechanisms might underlie third-party evaluation in these two species 14 
than in capuchin monkeys (see Anderson et al., 2016). Similarly, chimpanzees preferred to 15 
beg for food from a human they had previously observed giving food to a human beggar 16 
(Russell et al., 2008). These findings suggest that certain primate species incorporate third-17 
party interactions they have witnessed to evaluate foraging opportunities. 18 
4.2 Self- & other-regarding motivation 19 
Self- and other-regarding motives are certainly not mutually exclusive and they may carry the 20 
same or different weights when animals make decisions. As previously stated, mutualism per 21 
se does not provide evidence for other-regarding motivation. Sensitivity to others’ pay-offs 22 
when there are no costs for the individual, as implemented in the prosocial choice task, may 23 
evidence prosocial motives (possibly besides self-regarding ones). That is, prosocial motives 24 
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can be identified when a subject prefers options that deliver more food to the partner while 1 
the subject’s pay-offs remain unchanged. Importantly, such a preference should not occur in 2 
the absence of a partner (no-partner control condition). Furthermore, the impact of past 3 
(short-term) interactions and (long-term) social relationships on primates’ cooperative 4 
behavior may be indicative of prosocial motives modulating their decisions. 5 
4.2.1 Prosocial choice task 6 
In the prosocial choice task, researchers try to minimize instrumental demands and the impact 7 
of technical knowledge on the task performance. There are different versions of the task but 8 
the basic comparison is between a selfish option yielding a benefit for the subject but not for 9 
its partner (1/0 option), and a prosocial option resulting in a reward for the subject and its 10 
partner (1/1 option). Crucially, choosing the prosocial option (compared to the selfish option) 11 
does not involve costs for the subject. Prosocial choice tasks are operationalized either within 12 
token-exchange paradigms or within bar- /string-pulling tasks. Each token and bar, 13 
respectively, is associated with a certain payoff for the subject and the partner.  14 
In the prosocial choice paradigm, unsolicited preferences for the prosocial option have been 15 
found for capuchin monkeys (de Waal et al., 2008; Lakshminarayanan and Santos, 2008; 16 
Suchak and de Waal, 2012; Takimoto and Fujita, 2011; Takimoto et al., 2010; but see Amici 17 
et al., 2014), common marmosets (Burkart et al., 2007), and (dominant) long-tailed macaques 18 
(Massen et al., 2010). In contrast, other species did not show consistent prosocial preferences, 19 
such as Geoffroyi’s spider monkeys (Ateles geoffroyi), bonobos, orangutans, and gorillas 20 
(Gorilla gorilla; Amici et al., 2014b), and cotton-top tamarins (Cronin et al., 2009; Stevens, 21 
2010). Most studies with chimpanzees did not find any evidence for prosocial preferences 22 
(Amici et al., 2014b; Jensen et al., 2006; Silk et al., 2005; Vonk et al., 2008; Yamamoto and 23 
Tanaka, 2010). In one study, however, female chimpanzees displayed a significant preference 24 
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for prosocial tokens over selfish ones irrespective of solicitation by the partner (Horner et al., 1 
2011). Unfortunately, token-exchange studies that provided evidence for prosocial choice so 2 
far either did not include a control in which no partner was present (de Waal et al., 2008), or 3 
this no-partner control condition was always administered after the social test condition 4 
(Horner et al., 2011; Suchak and de Waal, 2012). Therefore, it remains ambiguous whether 5 
chimpanzees’ and capuchin monkeys’ token preferences in the test compared to the control 6 
condition result from an order effect.  7 
In the bar-pulling paradigm, there is some evidence that capuchin monkeys prefer the 8 
prosocial option specifically when the partner is present (compared to when it is not), but 9 
only when the partner helped them to retrieve the food (Takimoto and Fujita, 2011). Other 10 
bar-pulling studies found quite weak effects between the test condition and the no-partner 11 
control condition (two-tailed p-value= 0.1; Lakshminarayanan and Santos, 2008) or found 12 
that the effect depended on the dominance relationship between individuals (Takimoto et al., 13 
2010). 14 
Additional factors that influenced prosocial choice in capuchin monkeys were the visibility 15 
and familiarity of the partner and equal reward for both individuals (de Waal et al., 2008). 16 
Interestingly, when the subjects could not see their partner anymore, their preference 17 
switched from the prosocial option to the selfish one (de Waal et al., 2008; Takimoto et al., 18 
2010).  19 
 20 
 21 
4.2.2 Short-term reciprocity 22 
So far, we have looked at situations in which prosocial choices came with no costs for the 23 
subject. Now, we turn to primate cooperation with unbalanced outcomes or even net losses 24 
for the subject. Even if an individual is predominantly driven by self-regarding motives, 25 
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unbalanced or negative pay-offs may be tolerated. Mechanisms that allow for maintaining 1 
cooperation in such cases can be (calculated) short-term reciprocity or reciprocity based on 2 
long-term social relationships (see next section). In particular, turn-taking (or tit-for-tat) 3 
strategies may constitute evidence for calculated short-term reciprocity.  4 
Whether or not primates adopt turn-taking strategies has been examined using prosocial 5 
choice tasks with alternating roles for the individuals. So far, these studies produced little 6 
evidence for short-term reciprocity in nonhuman primates. Negative results have been 7 
obtained for great apes including chimpanzees (Amici et al., 2014a; Melis et al., 2008; Pelé et 8 
al., 2009; Yamamoto and Tanaka, 2009, 2010), bonobos, orangutans, and gorillas (Amici et 9 
al., 2014a; Pelé et al., 2009), as well as monkey species such as Tonkean macaques (Pelé et 10 
al., 2010), brown capuchin monkeys (Amici et al., 2014a; Pelé et al., 2010; Suchak and de 11 
Waal, 2012), and spider monkeys (Amici et al., 2014a). There are few exceptions: one study 12 
found some evidence for positive reciprocity in one out of 11 chimpanzee dyads (Brosnan et 13 
al., 2009). Another study found evidence for calculated reciprocity in one non-kin orangutan 14 
dyad (Dufour et al., 2009; Pelé et al., 2009). The two adult orangutans were reciprocally 15 
exchanging tokens and food with each other. Over time, the exchanges became more 16 
balanced between individuals and provided evidence for reciprocity within and between 17 
trials. Moreover, cotton top tamarins’ willingness to pull in a reward for the partner in a 18 
prosocial choice task depended on whether or not the partner had pulled in rewards for the 19 
subject before (Cronin et al. 2010).  20 
Apart from the emergence of such turn-taking strategies, the question is whether primates 21 
reciprocate received favors and select partners based on the outcome of recent interactions. 22 
When chimpanzees in a cooperation or helping situation could choose between a conspecific 23 
who had cooperated with them or helped them previously to obtain food and another one who 24 
had not, chimpanzees did not prefer the former (Melis et al., 2008). Furthermore, 25 
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chimpanzees did not help more or share more in response to having cooperated with a 1 
conspecific partner previously (Greenberg et al., 2010; Hamann et al., 2011). In contrast, 2 
capuchin monkeys seem to take other’s labor into consideration and distributed higher-value 3 
food to an individual who had helped them before (de Waal and Berger, 2000; Takimoto and 4 
Fujita, 2011). 5 
In a recent instrumental helping study (Engelmann et al., 2015), chimpanzees could choose 6 
between a non-social option (low-value food for subject) and a social option (high-value food 7 
for partner). If they chose the social option, the partner could reciprocate the favor by pulling 8 
a string in return, which would result in a high-value reward for the subject. Chimpanzees 9 
were more likely to choose the risky option when a partner was present in the adjacent 10 
enclosure than when the partner was absent (no-partner control). Interestingly, when 11 
chimpanzees’ willingness to reciprocate was experimentally manipulated, chimpanzees were 12 
more likely to take the risk when presented with a ‘trustworthy’ partner who always 13 
reciprocated compared to a ‘non-trustworthy’ partner who never reciprocated. This might 14 
suggest that chimpanzees are able to maintain reciprocal interactions if the partner is 15 
trustworthy. However, it is also possible that chimpanzees learned in the course of the ten 16 
trials per partner to adjust their behavior according to reinforcement schedule. Indeed, the 17 
likelihood of retrieving a reward and trustworthiness were identical in this study. In line with 18 
previous studies, the reciprocation rate in general was low (32% of trials in which the 19 
subjects chose the social option, see Engelmann et al., 2015, experiment 1) and not affected 20 
by the bonding status of the partners (Engelmann and Herrmann, 2016). 21 
4.2.3 Factors affecting prosocial tendencies: kinship, dominance, tolerance, and 22 
trust 23 
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In this section, we address the impact of temporally more stable characteristics of social 1 
relationships such as kinship, dominance hierarchies, tolerance, and bonding relationships on 2 
primates’ prosocial tendencies. Some of these factors are not independent. The precise 3 
relation between these factors depends on the species and it is sometimes difficult to tease 4 
their effects apart. For example, dominance relationships are often negatively correlated with 5 
tolerance. Tolerance within dyads is in many species higher for kin compared to non-kin and 6 
for bonding partners compared to other group members. 7 
For chimpanzees (Suchak et al., 2014; Yamamoto and Tanaka, 2009) and capuchin monkeys 8 
(Brosnan et al., 2006; de Waal and Davis, 2003) there is evidence that genetically related 9 
dyads are more willing to help and cooperate with each other. Chimpanzee mother-offspring 10 
dyads were more willing to help each other by transferring tools to each other (Yamamoto et 11 
al., 2009). Moreover, chimpanzees were more likely to approach a cooperation problem-12 
solving apparatus when kin or unrelated individuals of similar rank were around (Suchak et 13 
al., 2014). Similarly, capuchin monkey kin dyads were more tolerant toward clumped or 14 
unequal food distribution in mutual cooperation tasks compared to non-kin dyads (Brosnan et 15 
al., 2006; de Waal and Davis, 2003).  16 
Dominance relations and tolerance play an important role as well. In the prosocial choice 17 
tasks, higher-ranking individuals were more likely to choose the prosocial options for 18 
subordinate individuals in capuchin monkeys (de Waal et al., 2008; Takimoto et al., 2010) 19 
and long-tailed macaques (Massen et al., 2010). Dominance was also an important factor for 20 
successful cooperation in common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus). In a helping task that 21 
required one individual to pull a string so that the partner could grasp a bowl with food, 22 
success varied widely between dyads (Werdenich and Huber, 2002). In successful dyads, the 23 
subordinate individual would usually pull in the string and the dominant individual would 24 
grasp the bowl with food. Subsequently, the dominant individual usually shared the spoils 25 
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with the subordinate. Thus, tolerance of subordinates by dominants was important for 1 
cooperation in marmosets to occur. 2 
In (non-kin) capuchin monkey dyads, in contrast, the dominant individual would monopolize 3 
the food when the food was clumped on the platform in a cooperative bar-pulling task. 4 
Consequently, subordinates stopped pulling in the platform with the clumped food (de Waal 5 
and Davis, 2003). Similarly, in a cooperation task with unequal reward distribution, capuchin 6 
monkey dyads in which the high-value reward was not consistently monopolized by one of 7 
the individuals had much higher success rates (Brosnan et al., 2006). These findings suggest 8 
that tolerance of dominant individuals toward subordinates is an important predictor of 9 
successful cooperation. 10 
In the loose string pulling paradigm, tolerance (i.e., co-feeding and food sharing rates) was 11 
also an important predictor of success in chimpanzees (Melis et al., 2006c) and wild Barbary 12 
macaques, Macaca sylvanus (Molesti and Majolo, 2016). In a recent study, chimpanzees 13 
were more likely to choose a risky social option (success depended on the partner’s 14 
willingness to reciprocate) when paired with a close bonding partner compared to another 15 
group member not closely bonded with the subject (Engelmann and Herrmann, 2016).  16 
Differences in tolerance have been implicated in the fact that some species such as Tonkean 17 
macaques (Macaca tonkeana) and bonobos are more successful in cooperative problem-18 
solving tasks than others like, for example, rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) and 19 
chimpanzees (Hare et al., 2007; Petit et al., 1992; Tan and Hare, 2013). Similarly, common 20 
marmosets have been found to be more willing to provide food for group members compared 21 
to capuchin monkeys and Japanese macaques (Burkart and van Schaik, 2013). Success in the 22 
‘group service’ task is in line with marmosets’ higher co-feeding rates as compared to 23 
capuchin monkeys and macaques. 24 
4.3 Other-regarding motivation 25 
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Clear-cut cases of other-regarding motivation involve some costs for the helper (e.g. in terms 1 
of losing foraging opportunities or of physical effort). Alternatively, other-regarding 2 
motivation may be indicated when positive outcomes of a prosocial behavior cannot be 3 
anticipated and reciprocation appears unlikely (Yamamoto and Takimoto, 2012). Indicators 4 
of other-regarding motives might be instances of advantageous inequity aversion, 5 
instrumental helping, and active food sharing. 6 
4.3.1 Advantageous inequity aversion 7 
Advantageous inequity aversion describes a situation in which an individual rejects better 8 
pay-offs for him-/herself (compared to another individual) following equal labor of both 9 
individuals. This type of inequity aversion is well established in humans  even though it 10 
varies across societies and has a later developmental onset than disadvantages inequity 11 
aversion (e.g., Blake et al., 2015).  12 
In contrast, for nonhuman primates, the evidence is sparse. For chimpanzees, there is only 13 
one study suggesting that they reject high-value food rewards more often when their partner 14 
receives a low-value food reward (inequity) compared to when the partner receives the same 15 
high-value food (Brosnan et al., 2010b; but see Brosnan et al., 2005; Hopper et al., 2014). 16 
Moreover, the behavior of proposers in the mini-ultimatum game has also been interpreted as 17 
evidence for advantageous inequity aversion (Brosnan and de Waal, 2014). Such an 18 
interpretation, however, is problematic because the key feature of the ultimatum game is that 19 
the responder might reject any offer. Therefore, the proposer’s choice might well be 20 
influenced by the anticipated reaction of the responder. In fact, the only study that found a 21 
preference for equal splits also found that chimpanzees preferred the selfish token when the 22 
responder could not reject the offer (Proctor et al., 2013). Moreover, other studies that 23 
implemented the ultimatum game with chimpanzees found no evidence that proposers would 24 
favor equal splits (Jensen et al., 2007; Kaiser et al., 2012). 25 
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4.3.2 Instrumental helping 1 
Instrumental helping tests include tasks in which the helper activates a mechanism or 2 
transfers a resource to a recipient that will benefit the recipient but not the helper. Empty-3 
cage control tasks usually compare these helping situations to a baseline level in which no 4 
one benefits from the activation of the mechanism or the resource transfer. 5 
Initial evidence for instrumental helping in nonhuman primates has been obtained in tasks in 6 
which a human experimenter was reaching for an out-of-reach object. Helping was assessed 7 
by looking at whether nonhuman primates spontaneously transferred the object to the 8 
experimenter. Chimpanzees picked up objects and passed them to humans at similar rates as 9 
young human children (Warneken et al., 2007; Warneken and Tomasello, 2006). In 10 
particular, young chimpanzees picked up objects more readily when their human caretaker 11 
‘accidentally’ dropped the object and reached for it than when the caretaker intentionally 12 
threw it on the floor (Warneken and Tomasello, 2006). In another study, juvenile and adult 13 
chimpanzees passed an object to an unfamiliar human at equal rates irrespective of being 14 
rewarded for it or whether there were some costs associated with helping (in the high cost 15 
condition, chimpanzees had to climb up the mesh to retrieve the object). Importantly, 16 
chimpanzees passed the object more often to the human when the latter was reaching for it 17 
than not (Warneken et al., 2007). 18 
In a similar setup, capuchin monkeys also helped human experimenters by picking up a target 19 
object and passing it to the human who alternated her gaze between the object and the 20 
monkey (Barnes et al., 2008). However, the monkeys were much more inclined to do so 21 
when costs associated with helping were low (i.e. when the object was inside their enclosure 22 
and they could easily transfer it to the human). Moreover, much like chimpanzees, capuchin 23 
monkeys helped more often when the experimenter was actively reaching for the object. 24 
Thus, reaching gestures seem to be an important cue for nonhuman primates and might 25 
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communicate the actor’s goal to them, thereby, triggering their helping response. In some 1 
sessions, capuchin monkeys and chimpanzees received a reward from the experimenter for 2 
passing the object (Barnes et al., 2008; Warneken et al., 2007). Capuchin monkeys, in 3 
contrast to chimpanzees, passed the object at higher rates when receiving a reward for it. 4 
Even though monkeys could see whether or not a reward was in the hand of the experimenter 5 
at the beginning of each trial, direct reinforcement for passing the tool in some trials poses a 6 
problem for the interpretation of the motivational underpinnings of monkeys’ helping 7 
behavior. In general, studies involving human recipients are problematic regarding 8 
motivational aspects of prosocial behavior given that the precise reinforcement history is 9 
often unknown. Some authors note that captive primates regularly exchange objects with 10 
humans (e.g., Barnes et al., 2008). Even in the absence of explicit training for passing objects 11 
to human caretakers, animals might have been rewarded in the past for giving objects in their 12 
enclosure back to their caretakers. Therefore, the motivation behind passing objects to 13 
humans might reflect the expectation of receiving a reward at least occasionally in return. 14 
Occasional reinforcement can lead to stable performance that is very robust to extinction (cf. 15 
partial reinforcement effect; Amsel, 1962). Therefore, studies looking at interactions between 16 
conspecifics may be more telling with regard to the underlying motivation. 17 
In a very similar instrumental helping setting but with conspecific partners, chimpanzees 18 
passed tools to group members located in adjacent cages (Yamamoto et al., 2009, 2012). Tool 19 
transfers occurred more often in mother-offspring dyads compared to non-kin dyads. 20 
Moreover, chimpanzees passed the tool mostly upon request from their partner (see previous 21 
section on cognitive aspects). Tool transfer in mother-offspring dyads was selective and 22 
sensitive to the needs of the partner in that they preferentially passed the tool that their 23 
partner currently required (Yamamoto et al., 2012). One juvenile chimpanzee even actively 24 
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sought information about his mother's tool requirement (by standing up and looking through a 1 
peephole between the adjacent compartments) before passing the correct tool to her.  2 
Other studies showed that chimpanzees can release pegs to allow their non-kin partners to 3 
enter a room with food or to activate a food (or token) delivering mechanism for a 4 
conspecific (Melis et al., 2011; Warneken et al., 2007). Chimpanzees were more likely to 5 
release the pegs if their partner was unsuccessfully trying to access the food. Moreover, in 6 
one of these studies, distractors were used to reduce the baseline rate of “helping” even when 7 
no partner was present (Melis et al 2011). This suggests that releasing the peg irrespective of 8 
the partner’s presence might be rewarding for apes.  9 
Another study found quite high rates of instrumental helping in chimpanzees, which was in 10 
most cases spontaneous and, in contrast to previous studies, not dependent on requests by the 11 
individual that required help (Greenberg et al., 2010). In this study, chimpanzees were 12 
presented with a modified version of the loose string paradigm in which two individuals had 13 
to pull simultaneously to move a baited platform. The platform could be moved in two steps 14 
in two sequential positions. In the helping condition, one chimpanzee (the helper) could 15 
access her food after the first pull in the intermediate position of the platform whereas the 16 
other chimpanzee could access her food only after the second pull when the board was in its 17 
final position. Therefore, the latter chimpanzee was dependent upon the helper’s willingness 18 
to pull the rope one more time even when the helper had already received the food. Indeed, 19 
chimpanzees helped their partner to obtain their piece food by pulling the platform one more 20 
time. 21 
However, it has recently been suggested that the results of Greenberg et al. (2010) might be 22 
explained by the number of food items on the platform before the crucial second pulling step 23 
(Albiach-Serrano, 2015). Even though chimpanzees were trained to pull the platform alone 24 
by taking both ends of the rope and waiting for their partner, it was not established that they 25 
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knew when and where which piece of food was released in response to pulling the rope the 1 
first and second time, respectively. The number of food pieces in the final position could, in 2 
principle, explain the obtained pattern of results with the highest pulling rates in the 3 
mutualistic condition (two pieces of food in the final position) followed by the helping 4 
conditions (one piece of food in final position), and then the baseline condition (no food in 5 
final position). A control condition to address this criticism would be to check whether 6 
chimpanzees would also pull the platform to the final position even if their partner could not 7 
access the food. Furthermore, pulling the platform to the end might have been rewarding for 8 
chimpanzees because they could initiate the next trial in this way (if they did not pull the 9 
platform to the final position, there was a delay of 60 or 30 seconds before the experimenter 10 
started the next trial). At least for the first pairing of each subject, trials ended once both 11 
individuals had received the food (or once the rope was inaccessible).  12 
Similar to findings with chimpanzees (Yamamoto 2009), orangutans also passed tools 13 
actively to their offspring even when they did not receive a reward throughout an entire 14 
session (Völter et al., 2015). Adult orangutans continued passing the tools to adult group 15 
members (kin and non-kin) even if they were not rewarded continuously (i.e., they were not 16 
rewarded in 25% of trials, Rossano, Völter, and Call, in preparation). 17 
Capuchin monkeys barely differentiated in an instrumental helping paradigm between a 18 
partner being present or absent both when they were presented with food rewards and when 19 
they received tokens that could be exchanged for food (Brosnan et al., 2010a). However, it is 20 
possible that in some conditions a ceiling effect masked a difference between the social test 21 
condition and the no-partner control condition. The only significant indication that their 22 
partner’s presence affected capuchin monkeys’ performance was when there was no food for 23 
the subject and a low-value reward for the partner. Here, the monkeys were more likely to 24 
pull in the board when the partner was present. In contrast, when there was a high-value food 25 
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reward for the partner capuchin monkeys’ performance did not deviate from the no-partner 1 
control. 2 
4.3.3 Group service 3 
The group service task is a variant of the instrumental helping paradigm, which is 4 
administered in group settings (thereby facilitating the application of the task to a large 5 
number of species because it requires neither habituating individuals to being separated from 6 
their group nor special testing facilities suitable for individual testing). In this task, one 7 
individual needs to pull and hold a baited tray for other group members to access the food. 8 
This individual is therefore paying a cost (i.e. no access to the food) for the benefit of others. 9 
Common marmosets but not brown capuchin monkeys or Japanese macaques were found to 10 
provide food for others consistently across multiple sessions (Burkart and van Schaik, 2013). 11 
Marmosets pulled the tray without being solicited or harassed by others. Furthermore, a 12 
control showed that marmosets hardly pulled the tray when the group members could not 13 
access the food due to a fine grid that separated the monkeys and the food. 14 
Using the same paradigm, a large-scale comparative study with 15 primate species provided 15 
evidence for sustained prosocial pulling (at higher rates compared to a no-food control) in 16 
four out of five common marmoset groups, white-faced sakis (Pithecia pithecia), cotton-top 17 
tamarins, golden-headed lion tamarins (Leontopithecus chrysomelas), and siamangs 18 
(Hyblobates syndactylus). No evidence for such sustained prosocial actions was found in 19 
ring-tailed lemurs (Lemur catta), ruffed lemurs (Varecia variegata), spider monkeys, squirrel 20 
monkeys (Saimiri sciureus), three groups of brown capuchin monkeys, Japanese and lion-21 
tailed macaques (Macaca fuscata, M. silenus), gibbons (Hyblobates lar), and chimpanzees 22 
(Burkart et al., 2014). Interestingly, the best predictor of interspecies variance in prosociality 23 
in this paradigm was the extent of allomaternal care typical of the species. 24 
4.3.4 Food sharing 25 
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A detailed survey of primate food sharing studies is beyond the scope of the current article 1 
(for a recent review, see Jaeggi and Gurven, 2013a). Notwithstanding, we highlight here 2 
some findings relevant for the debate about other-regarding motives underpinning primate 3 
social interactions. Most instances of food sharing observed in nonhuman primates are 4 
passive or even enforced by the recipient despite resistance of the individual in possession of 5 
the food (Jaeggi and Gurven, 2013a). Instances of active, unsolicited food sharing are more 6 
informative about the presence of other-regarding motives. Active food sharing among 7 
unrelated adult individuals has been found, albeit at low rates, in chimpanzees (e.g., Silk et 8 
al., 2013), orangutans (Dufour et al., 2009; Rossano and Liebal, 2014), and brown capuchin 9 
monkeys (de Waal et al., 1993). Active food sharing between adult individuals and dependent 10 
offspring appears particularly pronounced in cooperatively breeding callitrichids (Brown et 11 
al., 2004) and is also present in great apes (e.g., Jaeggi et al., 2008; Silk, 1978). Harassment 12 
avoidance (Stevens, 2004) and reciprocity (Jaeggi and Gurven, 2013b) have been identified 13 
as predictors of food-sharing among non-kin individuals. Chimpanzees and squirrel monkeys, 14 
for example, were found to share more food when they were harassed by a conspecific 15 
(Stevens, 2004). Thus, even in the absence of other-regarding motives food sharing might 16 
arise to avoid costly harassment from others. 17 
 18 
4.4 Summary 19 
Overall, the results of prosocial choice, instrumental helping, group service, and food sharing 20 
tasks show a quite inconsistent pattern with many non-replications and high variance across 21 
studies that might result from different experimental paradigms (e.g., token exchange and bar 22 
pulling tasks), methodological differences within the same paradigm (e.g., the value of the 23 
food, proximity of the partners), and intraspecific variance between different groups (e.g., 24 
group composition and stability; see also Brosnan et al., 2010b). Therefore, it is too early to 25 
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draw any fixed conclusions about species differences with regard to social comparisons (in 1 
the form of inequity aversion) and prosocial motives. Future research should aim at clarifying 2 
the determinants that lead to the different study outcomes. 3 
For chimpanzees and brown capuchin monkeys, as best-studied primate species in this 4 
context, prosocial tendencies were found mostly in situations in which there were no food-5 
related costs for the subject. When helping or cooperation would potentially lead to 6 
competition over food between partners, helping or cooperation was rare. For capuchin 7 
monkeys, unbalanced payoffs may also hinder cooperation and helping. Chimpanzees seem 8 
to be more willing to pay a cost for others’ welfare in terms of physical effort (e.g., climbing 9 
up a mesh to retrieve an object for someone else). Capuchin monkeys, in contrast, seem to be 10 
more willing to help when their own labor investment is small. In line with this, capuchin 11 
monkeys were also found to be more sensitive to others’ labor and helped their partners more 12 
when the latter contributed to retrieve the reward.  13 
Even in studies that found evidence for prosocial tendencies, the effects sizes are often rather 14 
small (e.g., Brosnan et al., 2010a; Burkart et al., 2007; Lakshminarayanan and Santos, 2008), 15 
which may explain the low replication rate. However, given a presumed publication bias for 16 
positive results, these findings should be interpreted with caution. Harassment avoidance 17 
might account for helping and food sharing in response to solicitation, requests, or noisy 18 
attempts to access the food (Stevens, 2004). 19 
Finally, most studies so far have been somewhat biased toward prosocial behaviors, first, by 20 
not always giving subjects an alternative or opt-out option (e.g., instrumental helping tasks) 21 
and, second, by giving them a selfish and prosocial option but not a spiteful option (e.g., 22 
preventing others from accessing the food). More balanced experimental designs allowing 23 
animals to perform either in a prosocial, selfish, or spiteful manner towards conspecifics are 24 
needed. A good illustration of such an approach is a recent study, in which chimpanzees 25 
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could release a peg either to allow another individual to access food or to stop the individual 1 
from accessing food. Chimpanzees were equally likely to release the peg in these two 2 
conditions, suggesting that acts of instrumental helping might not necessarily be underpinned 3 
by other-regarding motives (Tennie, Call, & Jensen. Submitted). These findings are in line 4 
with a harassment avoidance account of helping behaviors in chimpanzees. 5 
Finally, there is little evidence for calculated short-term reciprocity in nonhuman primates. 6 
Long-term social relationships (including kinship, dominance relations, and friendships) 7 
appear to be more relevant with regard to cooperation and helping. Social tolerance (usually 8 
measured with co-feeding rates) seems to be the mediating variable between social 9 
relationships and successful cooperation. The species-typical connection between social 10 
relationships and tolerance might also explain species differences in how some social 11 
variables (such as dominance) affect helping and cooperation.  12 
 13 
5. The relation between cognition and motivation: proximate and ultimate aspects 14 
Although coercion usually relates to self-regarding motives and sharing information (e.g., 15 
about the presence of a predator) is often linked to other-regarding motives, the two axes, 16 
capturing motivational and cognitive aspects, are independent. For example, there are cases 17 
in which acts of physical coercion may have prosocial motives. Mother rhesus macaques and 18 
chacma baboons (Papio ursinus), for instance, have been observed to pull their infants back 19 
to protect them from abuse by other individuals or other potentially dangerous situations 20 
(Bolwig, 1959; Kawamura, 1959). However, similar actions may occur with quite different 21 
underlying motives, for example, when male baboons try to avoid aggressive interactions by 22 
picking up infants (cf. agonistic buffering, e.g. Strum, 1984). Social interactions not 23 
involving physical coercion often depend on matching goals with both self- and, at least in 24 
some instances, other-regarding motives at work. However, control over others can also be 25 
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indirect by granting access to relevant resources. Transfer of resources (such as tools or 1 
tokens) between partners offers an example of such indirect control, which may serve self- or 2 
other-regarding motives depending on the context.  3 
Manipulative abilities and prosocial motivation may have quite different evolutionary origins. 4 
Prosociality has been related to cooperative breeding (Burkart and van Schaik, 2016) whereas 5 
social manipulation and deception have been related to living in complex social systems 6 
(Byrne and Whiten, 1988; Dunbar, 1998). In a large test battery with 15 primate species, 7 
allomaternal care was found to be the best predictor of prosocial behaviors in the group 8 
service paradigm (Burkart et al., 2014). In line with this, the cooperative breeding hypothesis 9 
suggests that cooperative breeders are more tolerant and prosocial and that these motivational 10 
factors facilitate their performance in certain socio-cognitive tasks (Burkart and van Schaik, 11 
2016).  12 
While high tolerance may be a prerequisite for success in many cooperation problems and 13 
social learning tasks, it does not predict more sophisticated socio-cognitive abilities per se. 14 
Indeed, there is no evidence that cooperative breeders have advanced social manipulation, 15 
communicative systems, or theory of mind abilities compared to other primates. Conversely, 16 
species such as chimpanzees, macaques, and capuchin monkeys that performed rather poorly 17 
in the group service paradigm (compared to cooperative breeders) provide the most 18 
compelling evidence for highly flexible socio-cognitive abilities. Cooperation and 19 
competition over resources in complex social systems has been hypothesized to be a driving 20 
factor for the evolution of flexible socio-cognitive abilities (Byrne and Whiten, 1988; 21 
Dunbar, 1998). These socio-cognitive abilities (such as visual perspective taking, goal 22 
understanding, and social learning), in turn, may be advantageous for both social 23 
manipulation and cooperation. 24 
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5.1 Nonhuman primates compared to humans 1 
Already in young children, cooperation seems to be supported by an intrinsic prosocial 2 
motivation and the relevant cognitive abilities scaffolding cooperation, such as understanding 3 
others’ communicative intentions, representing joint goals, and joint attention (Tomasello, 4 
2010). Children prefer cooperating with others to working individually in a food acquisition 5 
context (Rekers et al., 2011), and they share the spoils of their cooperation (Hamann et al., 6 
2011). Furthermore, communication allows children to coordinate their joint efforts 7 
effectively (e.g., Duguid et al., 2014). They communicate not only to request help from others 8 
and to achieve their own goals but also to help and inform them (e.g., Bullinger et al., 2011c; 9 
Liszkowski et al., 2006). 10 
In contrast, studies with nonhuman primates (in particular great apes) so far suggest either 11 
that they prefer acquiring food individually to cooperating with others or that they are 12 
indifferent (Bullinger et al., 2013; Bullinger et al., 2011a; Rekers et al., 2011). If they 13 
communicate in cooperative situations at all (e.g., begging gestures in food sharing 14 
situations), their communication seems to be driven by self-regarding motives to maximize 15 
their own pay-off. Often communication in these situations serves to solicit help and support 16 
from others (e.g., Duguid et al., 2014; Moore et al., 2015; Yamamoto et al., 2009). 17 
Conversely, in an experimental context, there is no evidence for nonhuman primates 18 
communicating to help others (e.g., Bullinger et al., 2014; with the exception of a field 19 
experiment suggesting that chimpanzees warn unaware conspecifics when they encounter a 20 
potentially dangerous situation, see Crockford et al., 2012). In line with that, chimpanzees, 21 
reliably point to objects when they themselves can benefit from it but not to help humans 22 
obtain a reward (Bullinger et al., 2011c). Chimpanzees’ pointing gestures, therefore, have 23 
been classified as imperative pointing (serving to request objects for themselves) but not as 24 
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declarative pointing to inform others (with the exception of language trained chimpanzees 1 
who, according to some authors, produce declaratives, see Lyn et al., 2011; Rivas, 2005). 2 
It has been proposed that the evolutionary origins of human cooperative communication can 3 
be found in situations in which cooperation resulted in a mutually beneficial outcome 4 
(Tomasello, 2010). In such situations, communication (based on shared intentions) may help 5 
to coordinate cooperative activities, thereby, increasing the mutual pay-off. Nonhuman 6 
primates’ communication, however, differs from human communication significantly and can 7 
be described as a form of social tool use mainly serving self-regarding goals. Warning calls 8 
may be an exception to this characterization. For example, chimpanzees have been observed 9 
to warn conspecifics when they encounter a potentially dangerous situation (Crockford et al., 10 
2012). It remains to be seen whether there are other cases of cooperative communication 11 
outside the warning call system. 12 
Manipulating others like a tool to fulfill self-regarding and in some cases other-regarding 13 
motives appears fundamental for nonhuman primates’ social interactions. Social tool use 14 
shares some features with physical tool use, such as means-end reasoning and action 15 
planning, but it differs from it in other aspects, such as the self-initiated actions by the social 16 
tool. To what extent social tool use and cooperation are linked to physical tool use is 17 
currently unclear. Interestingly, physical tool use and tactical deception rates in primates 18 
(based on observational evidence) have both been correlated with the volume of executive 19 
brain areas (Byrne and Corp, 2004; Reader and Laland, 2002). Moreover, so far the 20 
experimental evidence for social tool use in nonhuman primates seems to be restricted to 21 
tool-using species, such as chimpanzees, orangutans, and Japanese macaques (but there is 22 
observational evidence for agonistic buffering in olive baboons, Barbary macaques, and 23 
geladas). Therefore, cognitive processes supporting tool-use may well be related to social 24 
manipulation. Shared variance between physical and social tool use might not only be found 25 
50 
 
 
 
at the species level but also within species at the individual level. Future research might 1 
examine whether skilled tool-users show more elaborate forms of social manipulation 2 
compared to tool-novices. 3 
Social tool use usually involves self-initiated and self-controlled actions by the social tool. In 4 
many situations, the social tool user must take such actions that are beyond its control into 5 
account to achieve its goal. Due to the limited control over the social tool, sensitivity to the 6 
goals and incentives of the social tool is important. In line with this, numerous studies in the 7 
last two decades have shown that great apes (in particular, chimpanzees) and some monkey 8 
species (e.g., rhesus macaques) are sensitive to the perception, knowledge states, and goals of 9 
conspecific competitors (Whiten, 2013). The social tool-use account may allow us to bridge 10 
the gap between theory of mind and cooperation. Future research should further explore the 11 
relationship between manipulation and cooperation; first, by looking at cooperation (e.g., 12 
with in-group members) to compete with others (e.g., with out-group members) and, second, 13 
by looking at social tool use and theory of mind abilities within cooperative situations (cf. 14 
Schmelz and Call, 2016). The orangutan case study we presented illustrates how primates 15 
manipulate one another while cooperating with each other. Importantly, manipulative 16 
attempts do not exclude the existence of prosocial motives. Orangutans, for instance, 17 
maintained cooperation across sessions in which there were no rewards for them. 18 
The social tool use account may also explain why, according to the experimental literature, 19 
chimpanzees and other primates conceal their actions from others but do not communicate to 20 
mislead them (e.g., Karg et al., 2015; Melis et al., 2006a). Actively misleading other 21 
individuals may – at least when it is flexible and not just a learned or innate strategy - not 22 
only require to take others’ perspectives and goals into account but may rely on the mutual 23 
expectation that other individuals are helpful and truthful (Tomasello, 2010). Without such an 24 
expectation, one should not assume that others follow misleading communicative signals. 25 
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This expectation may be a feature unique to humans. Understanding others in terms of their 1 
goals, and perception may be sufficient to account for cases of tactical deception and social 2 
tool use found in nonhuman primates (Whiten and Byrne, 1988)  3 
 4 
6. Conclusions 5 
In this paper, we classified a wide range of social interactions found in the experimental 6 
literature on nonhuman primates along a cognitive and a motivational axis. These axes work 7 
in conjunction to produce a variety of solutions to social problems (see Fig. 3). 8 
With regard to the cognitive aspects, among nonhuman primates great apes seem to be 9 
particularly flexible in the ways they cooperate with one another and manipulate their 10 
partners. Chimpanzees and orangutans use different means to manipulate others, ranging 11 
from physical coercion to communication. Usually communication mainly serves to solicit 12 
help from others. Communication to help or inform others, in contrast, seems to be rare in 13 
nonhuman primates (with the notable exception of alarm calls, e.g., Seyfarth et al., 1980), 14 
unless they have received language training. Interestingly, despite their semi-solitary 15 
lifestyle, orangutans provide some of the most compelling evidence for flexible social 16 
manipulation involving physical coercion, indirect control by granting access to resources, 17 
and communication. Even though social behavior has been documented extensively in 18 
nonhuman primates, a broader phylogenetic assessment of social manipulation is missing in 19 
the experimental literature. Building on the rich observational evidence, more experimental 20 
work is required to elucidate the cognition behind social manipulation in primates, notably 21 
beyond the great ape clade. 22 
52 
 
 
 
With regard to motivational aspects, the last two decades have seen a growing number of 1 
studies suggesting other-regarding preferences in nonhuman primates (that are not limited to 2 
kin), in particular, in brown capuchin monkeys and chimpanzees. Long-term characteristics 3 
of social relationships (including friendships, dominance, and kinship) appear to have a larger 4 
impact on prosociality than short-term interactions, for instance in the form of calculated 5 
reciprocity. However, the robustness of these findings is weakened by many non-replications. 6 
Considerable inter-individual and inter-group variance seems to be a contributing factor for 7 
the low replication rate together with methodological differences across studies. Identifying 8 
the precise determinants of this high variance in results across studies will be a tedious but 9 
critical endeavor in future research.  10 
The most widely used paradigms in prosociality research are the prosocial choice task and 11 
instrumental helping paradigms. On the one hand, prosocial choice tasks have the advantage 12 
that animals have a clear choice between prosocial and selfish options. On the other hand, 13 
instrumental helping studies usually include direct interactions between animals, which 14 
makes them more interesting from a social manipulation point of view. Opt-out options or 15 
spiteful alternatives should be implemented in these paradigms to assess whether the helping 16 
behavior is really supported by other-regarding motives.  17 
In general, many study designs in this area seem mainly aimed at showing prosocial but not 18 
exploitative or even spiteful behaviors (for an exception, see Jensen et al., 2006). More 19 
balanced paradigms are required that include exploitative options or that can elucidate 20 
hierarchical structures of self- and other-regarding preferences. Prosocial choice tasks could 21 
be extended for this purpose, for example, by introducing some costs for the subject (e.g., 2/0 22 
vs 1/1). Comparing such a costly condition with the standard no-cost condition (1/0 vs 1/1) 23 
might elucidate species-specific trade-offs between self- and other-regarding motivation. 24 
Moreover, not all studies explicitly compared social and nonsocial situations (or the 25 
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conditions were not administered in a counterbalanced order). Without such no-partner 1 
control conditions, it remains unclear whether primates’ prosocial behavior reflects other-2 
regarding motives, a limited understanding of the task-relevant contingencies, or an intrinsic 3 
(self-regarding) preference for some particular options. 4 
Finally, the social tool account of exploitation and cooperation in primates might be useful to 5 
close the gap between the theory of mind literature, which is mostly based on competitive 6 
situations and the work on prosocial motivation. Although some authors have argued that 7 
competitive contexts may have been the main setting for the evolution of mindreading 8 
abilities (e.g., Hare, 2001; Hare and Tomasello, 2004; Santos et al., 2006), cooperative 9 
contexts may have also played an important role. The reasons for underestimating the 10 
contribution of cooperative contexts are partly historical, with much more emphasis being 11 
placed on competition than cooperation in the area of comparative social cognition, and 12 
partly methodological, with competitive paradigms being easier to implement than 13 
cooperative ones (Schmelz and Call, 2016). Nevertheless, there is some evidence suggesting 14 
that individuals can take into account others’ psychological states when communicating in 15 
non-competitive interactions (e.g., Crockford et al., 2012; Kaminski et al., 2004; Yamamoto 16 
et al., 2012). Comparing social manipulation and communication in competitive and 17 
cooperative situations will reveal how motivation and socio-cognitive abilities are related in 18 
different species. The experimental designs should also more often implement possibilities 19 
for (direct or indirect) partner control and partner choice (see Noë, 2006). This might also 20 
produce more evidence for manipulative and communicative strategies between partners. 21 
From a psychological perspective, manipulation and communication are particularly 22 
interesting when they are flexible and intentional. Therefore, it is important to examine 23 
whether primates use these behaviors in a context-specific manner, based on shared 24 
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experiences with certain individuals, while taking others’ goals and incentives into 1 
consideration. 2 
Future research should aim at broadening the phylogenetic sample. In particular, species of 3 
particular relevance with regard to their phylogenetic position or their socioecology should be 4 
targeted while using standardized methods (as illustrated by recent studies, see Amici et al., 5 
2014a; Burkart et al., 2014). To achieve this, simple setups are required that do not require 6 
extensive training or technical knowledge (see Albiach-Serrano 2015), especially to facilitate 7 
comparisons with non-primates (Marshall-Pescini et al., 2016). Physiological measures of 8 
emotional responsivity and arousal (such as pupil dilation, e.g., Hepach et al., 2012; and 9 
thermal imaging, e.g., Kano et al., 2016) may allow to detect other-regarding preferences and 10 
related cognitive biases (such as inequity aversion) even if they are not manifested 11 
behaviorally. Future research on social interactions will benefit from using these measures 12 
more widely as a complementary source of information to behavioral assessments. 13 
  14 
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Figure captions 1 
Figure 1. Social interactions can be classified along (a) a cognitive axis and (b) a motivational 2 
axis. Both axes focus on the proximate mechanisms underlying social interactions. 3 
Figure 2. Examples of social tool use and cooperation in orangutans (Pongo abelii). a and b. 4 
Orangutan mothers coerced their offspring into retrieving a food reward by guiding their 5 
arms and bodies toward a food reward and pulling them back as soon as the juveniles grabbed 6 
the food. c. If necessary to obtain a food reward, orangutans spontaneously passed a tool to 7 
their offspring. The offspring could use the tool to activate a mechanism that eventually 8 
would deliver food to both of them. d. Adult orangutans cooperated by passing a tool to each 9 
other. When the tool recipient had a nonsocial alternative apparatus mounted below the 10 
cooperation apparatus, orangutans started to pass the tool high above their head, presumably 11 
to influence their partner’s decision in favor of the cooperative option. 12 
Figure 3. In conjunction, the cognitive and motivational axes capture a wide range of primate 13 
social interactions. 14 
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